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ABSTRACT 
National Institutions and High Tech Industries: A Varieties of Capitalism 
Perspective on the Failure of Germany's "Neuer Markt" 
  
by Sigurt Vitols and Lutz Engelhardt 
 
One of the more prominent recent failures in institutional innovation in Germany 
was the Neuer Markt (1997-2003), a special segment of the Frankfurt stock 
exchange designed for high-growth companies. Based in part on insights from 
the law and economics approach to agency theory, which emphasizes 
transparency in financial reporting and shareholder rights, the Neuer Markt was 
an attempt to promote high-tech sectors through increasing the supply of risk 
capital in Germany. Proponents of the agency approach have suggested that 
the Neuer Markt failed because reporting requirements and shareholder 
protection were still inadequate, and have argued for even stricter financial 
regulation.  
This paper offers an alternative explanation for the failure of the Neuer Markt 
based on the Varieties of Capitalism (VOC) approach. This explanation focuses 
on the complementarities between financial markets and labor markets. 
Successful entrepreneurial companies require both capital and experienced 
managers and scientists willing to take higher risks in search of higher returns. 
Although the supply of risk-friendly capital increased briefly in the late 1990s in 
Germany, labor markets did not fundamentally change. In particular, mobility in 
the market for mid-career scientists and managers remains quite low, making it 
difficult for startups to attract the experienced knowledge workers they need to 
succeed. 
 
Keywords: Startups, Venture Capital, IPO, Stock Market, High Tech, Software 
 
JEL Classification: L86, G30 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
 
 
 
Nationale Institutionen und High-Tech-Industrien: Eine „Varieties of 
Capitalism“-Perspektive auf den Misserfolg des deutschen Neuen Marktes 
 
 
Einer der letzten bedeutenden Fehlschläge bezüglich institutioneller Innovation 
in Deutschland war der Neue Markt (1997-2003), ein spezielles Segment der 
Frankfurter Börse, das für Wachstumsunternehmen konzipiert worden war. Auf 
Beiträgen des Recht- und Ökonomie-Ansatzes der Agency-Theory  basierend, 
welcher transparente Unternehmensberichterstattung und Kleinanlegerschutz 
betont, war der Neue Markt ein Versuch, High-Tech-Sektoren in Deutschland 
durch höheren Risikokapitalzufluss voran zu bringen. Befürworter des Agency-
Ansatzes vertreten auch nach dem Scheiterns des Neuen Marktes die Ansicht, 
der Neue Markt sei ein Misserfolg gewesen, da Offenlegungspflicht und 
Aktionärsschutz noch nicht ausreichend ausgeprägt waren. Eine ihrer 
Forderungen für zukünftige Politikentwürfe sind folgerichtig noch strengere 
Regulationen an den Aktienmärkten.  
Dieser Text bietet eine alternative Erklärung für den Misserfolg des Neuen 
Marktes, die sich auf den „Varieties of Capitalism“-Ansatz (VOC) beruft. Sie 
richtet sich auf Komplementaritäten zwischen Finanz- und Arbeitsmärkten. 
Erfolgreiche Unternehmen benötigen nicht nur Kapital, sondern auch erfahrene 
Manager und Wissenschaftler, die bereit sind, auf der Suche nach höheren 
Erträgen das Risiko einer Anstellung bei einem Wachstumsunternehmen 
einzugehen. Obwohl das Angebot von risikofreundlichem Kapital in Deutschland 
in den späten 90er Jahren kurz anstieg, änderten sich die Arbeitsmärkte nicht 
grundlegend. Insbesondere blieb die Mobilität von Wissenschaftlern und 
Managern zur Mitte ihrer Laufbahn recht niedrig, was es für 
Wachstumsunternehmen schwierig machte, erfahrene Wissensarbeiter zu 
rekrutieren. Dies entzog jungen Unternehmen das für schnelles Wachstum und 
den wirtschaftlichen Erfolg benötigte Talent. 
1. Introduction 
 
One of the key challenges for economic policy in Germany since the 1980s has 
been to try to reduce the gap relative to the US with regard to the development of 
high technology industry ("high tech").1 In the debate on the causes of this 
perceived backwardness, differences between the financial systems of the two 
countries have received special attention. In particular, the shortage of equity 
capital available for high risk, but potentially high return investments in startup 
companies (i.e. "risk capital") has been identified as a serious barrier to the 
development of high-tech in Germany (Albach 1983; Pfirrmann, Wupperfeld, and 
Lerner 1997). Although Germany has a well-developed banking system, bank 
lending is inappropriate for financing high tech startups due to the high risk of 
failure and the lack of fixed assets that could serve as security for the loans. 
 
In addressing this issue over the past decade, the policymaking community has 
been strongly influenced by the law and economics approach to agency theory 
(Hart 1995; La Porta et al. 1997; La Porta et al. 1998; Posner 1973). In contrast 
with earlier work in financial economics, which focused on the cost of capital, the 
law and economics perspective emphasizes problems in the governance and 
monitoring of companies by shareholders, as well as conflicts of interest between 
large and small shareholders. According to this perspective, key regulatory 
problems in Germany have been the lack of transparency in company reporting 
and the weakness of shareholder rights (Hopt 1995; Hopt, Rudolph, and Baum 
1997). As a result, potential investors have been discouraged from providing risk 
capital to high-tech startups.  
 
Based in part on the agency perspective, a major institutional innovation was 
introduced in Germany in 1997: the creation of a special segment of the Frankfurt 
stock exchange called the "Neuer Markt" (Beike, Köttner, and Schlütz 2000; 
Knips 2000). In contrast with the main stock exchange, the listing rules of the 
Neuer Markt required more detailed and frequent reporting by companies, and 
also provided for stronger protection of small shareholders. Initially the Neuer 
Markt appeared to be a great success. The number of new companies raising 
capital through listing on the stock market and offering shares to the investing 
public (in financial jargon an "initial public offering", or IPO) increased from an 
average of roughly 20 per year in the first half of the 1990s to about 130 in both 
1999 and 2000. Much of this activity was in "new economy" companies. The 
Neuer Markt became the clear leader of the set of stock markets or market 
segments created for small high-tech companies in Europe in the late 1990s.  
 
However, following a sharp decline in stock prices after March 2000 (the so-
called "bursting of the stock market bubble"), the level of IPO activity declined 
                                                 
1 The authors gratefully acknowledge partial financial support through the European Commission 
Key Action "Improving the socio-economic knowledge base", contract No. HPSE-CT-2002-00146. 
Valuable suggestions for improvement were provided by Thomas Cusack, David Soskice, Moira 
Nelson, Philipp Rehm, and Babette Hagemann.    
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rapidly. Due in part to a total standstill in IPOs activity, the Neuer Markt was 
declared a failure by its owners and closed in 2003. Proponents of the agency 
approach argue that a number of scandals and cases of conflicts of interest show 
that regulation in fact was not strong enough to satisfy the concerns of small 
investors. According to this view, the policy solution to this problem is to increase 
the degree of regulation even further.  
 
This paper offers an alternative point of view based on the varieties of capitalism 
(VOC) approach developed by Peter Hall, David Soskice, and a number of other 
scholars (Hall and Soskice 2001).  According to this view, the main cause of 
failure of the Neuer Markt was not the weakness of the financial regulatory 
system, but rather the difficulty of transplanting individual institutional features of 
liberal market economies (LMEs, or countries characterized by the dominance of 
markets as coordinating mechanisms) such as the US to coordinated market 
economies (CMEs, or countries in which non-market mechanisms play a much 
greater role in economic coordination) such as Germany. Specifically, the 
broader financial system and labor markets in Germany represent a hostile 
environment into which it is very difficult to successfully import institutions that 
work well in places like Silicon Valley. On the capital market side, Germany lacks 
a significant capitalized pension system (the main source of equity capital in LME 
countries like the US) and the household sector has invested for the most part in 
less risky types of assets. Household investment in Neuer Markt companies in 
the late 1990s represented a "brief summer" of flirtation with equity culture 
influenced by the world wide internet euphoria. On the labor market side, the lack 
of an open market for mid-career scientists and entrepreneurs makes it very 
difficult to attract the type of labor needed to create successful high-growth 
entrepreneurial companies, i.e. the Microsofts and Intels of the future. As a 
result, no companies based on the Silicon Valley entrepreneurial model of 
organization have developed successful "blockbuster" products needed to 
achieve a high level of sales. A critical mass of such companies, it is argued 
here, would have been needed to sustain the Neuer Markt in the long run. 
 
The second section of the paper reviews the debate on the "high tech problem" 
in Germany and the focus on financial factors as the key bottleneck here in light 
of agency theory. The third section describes the rise and fall of the Neuer Markt 
and policy prescriptions offered by the agency perspective. The fourth section 
offers an alternative explanation for the failure of the Neuer Markt in terms of the 
VOC framework. The fifth section summarizes and concludes by discussing 
policy alternatives for Germany in view of this analysis.  
 
 
2. The Debate on the Weakness of High Tech in Germany 
 
In the 1980s a sustained debate started in Germany on the causes of a 
perceived backwardness in the development of newer, high-tech (i.e. research 
and development intensive) industries (Albach 1983; Pfirrmann, Wupperfeld, and 
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Lerner 1997). Although Germany was a clear world leader in so-called medium-
tech industries, such as motor vehicles, machinery, and chemicals, it was less 
successful in the development of newer industries, such as semiconductors, 
computer hardware, software, and biotechnology. Indicators of backwardness 
here included the level of start-up activity (i.e. foundation of new firms in these 
sectors), world market share of high tech products, and number of high tech firms 
offering "blockbuster" products (i.e. research-intensive mass standardized goods, 
such as microprocessors or operating system software).  
 
One possible explanation for this weakness in high tech is offered by the new 
institutional economics (NIE). This approach analyzes microeconomic behavior in 
terms of the economics of information and contracting (the "principal-agent" 
approach) (Berglöf 1991; Williamson 1985; Williamson 1988). Information is 
assumed to be both imperfect and costly. Furthermore, relationships between 
parties are subject to "moral hazard"; that is, agents will engage in self-interested 
opportunistic behavior in the absence of monitoring mechanisms and incentives 
to behave in the contracting principal's interests. Cross-national differences in 
financial contracting can in part be explained by the varying levels of success 
different legal and regulatory regimes have in increasing transparency and 
controlling opportunistic behavior (Berglöf 1991; La Porta et al. 1997).  
 
A leading example of this type of analysis is provided by the influential article 
"Legal Determinants of External Finance" (La Porta et al. 1997). In this article La 
Porta et al. examine the relationship between types of legal regimes and financial 
regulations on the one hand and a number of indicators of national financial 
development on the other hand. Regression analysis of these variables for 49 
countries explains about half of the cross-national variation in IPO activity (the 
rate of IPOs per million population) in 1995-96. This analysis, it is argued, shows 
that the nature of the legal system is the most significant determinant of the IPO 
rate. Common law systems predominant in English-origin countries are 
particularly supportive of IPOs. Specific financial regulations also have a 
significant positive impact, including the "one share-one vote" principle and rights 
enabling shareholders to overcome management opposition. The GDP growth 
rate variable was also significant, but the size of the coefficient was small; the 
absolute level of GDP was not a significant variable. The implications of this 
analysis is that countries can improve their level of financial development, 
including the rate of IPO activity, by adopting elements of the common law 
system and/or financial regulations strengthening shareholder rights.  
 
Policy analyses based on this approach have put major emphasis on the need 
for strict regulation to promote the supply of "risk capital" to finance the growth of 
the firm. High tech firms generally loose substantial amounts of money in the first 
years after foundation. In the earliest stage of growth (start-up phase), the firm 
incurs costs for research and development (R&D) for new products, but generally 
earns little or no income (see Table 1). In the expansion stage the firm's revenue 
increases with growing sales of new products. However, the firm frequently is not 
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yet profitable due to the costs of expanding production facilities and/or sales and 
marketing operations. Only in the later stages of development will the firm have a 
stable profits base due to an established market and economies of scale.   
 
 
 
TABLE 1: Profitability and Potential Sources of Finance at Different  
Stages of the Firm's Development 
 
 
Stage of High-Tech 
Business 
Development 
 
 
Profitability of 
company 
 
Sources of Finance 
Seed and Start-up Little or no revenue, 
i.e. ca. 100 % 
losses 
Founder  
 
Early-stage venture capital 
 
Business angel 
 
 
Expansion Decreasing losses  Later stage venture capital 
 
Growth stock market IPO  
 
 
Later stage Profitable Traditional stock market IPO 
 
  Source: Own compilation. 
 
 
 
In this context, the institutional structure of the German financial system has 
been criticized for not satisfying the needs of startup firms and risk-friendly 
investors (Beike, Köttner, and Schlütz 2000; Knips 2000). Until the mid 1990s a 
key feature of the German financial system was that the universal banks 
controlling the Frankfurt stock exchange only allowed IPOs of companies with a 
solid history of profitability. Loss-making high tech companies in the early stages 
of development were therefore excluded from the market.  
 
A second problem was lack of transparency, which made it difficult for investors 
to judge the risks involved in investing in high tech companies. Whereas the 
practice for companies listed in the US is to report their financial status on a 
quarterly basis (i.e. every three months), German listed companies for the most 
part would report on an annual basis, or only provide limited quarterly 
information. Furthermore, German companies used German HGB 
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(Handelsgesetzbuch, i.e. Commercial Code) accounting standards, which were 
considered to give companies too much leeway in deciding how to report their 
financial situation and hide income. Furthermore, companies were not required to 
provide a cash-flow statement to supplement the balance sheet and income 
statements.  
 
Finally, minority shareholder protection was considered inadequate. Insider 
investors (e.g. founders and family) and large institutional investors typically have 
greater influence and better access to information than small shareholders. This 
advantageous position can be used to make money by purchasing shares before 
positive information becomes public (or losses avoided by selling before negative 
information becomes public.  
 
These weaknesses were held to prevent or to discourage not only potential 
investors in the IPOs of growing high-tech companies, but also to stunt 
investment in much younger companies many years away from an IPO. The 
early-stage portion of the venture capital market is dependent upon an active 
stock market, since venture capitalists typically would not invest in early-stage 
companies without the possibility of exiting their investments a few years later 
through an IPO. In the first half of the 1990s there was much less German 
venture capital activity than in the US, and this activity was concentrated much 
more in later stage companies than was the case in the US (Pfirrmann, 
Wupperfeld, and Lerner 1997).   
 
 
3. The Rise and Fall of the Neuer Markt 
 
The agency perspective had a great influence on the institutional design of the 
Neuer Markt, which was founded in March 1997, as well as on other growth 
markets in Europe founded around the same time (Garz, Gilles, and Volk 1999; 
Posner 2000a; Posner 2000b). In the 1970s and early 1980s, financial 
economics literature stressed the cost of capital and the hierarchy of finance (i.e. 
differential preferences for different types of financing). In 1987 a special 
segment of the Frankfurt stock exchange (the "geregelter Markt") was created 
under the influence of the "cost of capital" approach. This approach emphasized 
the higher cost of capital for smaller firms, due in part to the high fixed costs 
involved in an IPO. Less strict regulation for smaller firms was recommended to 
compensate for these higher costs. However, the "geregelter Markt" failed to 
significantly increase the number of IPOs in Germany.  
 
The Neuer Markt was designed to address a number of deficiencies in the main 
stock market in Frankfurt vis-à-vis smaller growth companies (Vitols 2001). 
Specific features of the Neuer Markt included: 
 
• Greater transparency for investors, particularly for smaller “outsider” 
investors who did not have intimate access to company management. 
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Companies listing on the Neuer Markt were required to report on a 
quarterly basis (i.e. more frequently than companies on the main market). 
Furthermore, international accounting standards (US-GAAP or IAS), which 
were considered more reliable than the German HGB standards, were to 
be used;  
 
• Liberal listing requirements, which allowed relatively new companies as 
well as loss-making companies to get a listing;  
 
• Increased protection for small shareholders, for example in defining a 
minimum period of time after the IPO during which inside investors could 
not sell their shares ("lock-up period").    
 
• Greater liquidity, that is, the ability to buy or sell shares near the current 
market price, provided though a system of designated sponsors obligated 
to provide bid-ask market quotes (prices at which the designated sponsor 
would buy or sell shares).  
 
Thus the Neuer Markt was designed to mimic a number of aspects of the US 
NASDAQ (National Association of Securities Dealers electronic exchange), home 
of high-tech successes such as Microsoft, Intel, Cisco Systems, JDS Uniphase, 
Dell Computer, Biogen and Amgen. 
 
Initially the Neuer Markt got off to a slow start, with only twelve IPOs in 1997 (see 
Chart 1). In addition, a number of companies transferred from other segments of 
the Frankfurt stock exchange. Nevertheless, some of these turned out to be rapid 
successes, such as the new mobile phone company Mobilcom, one of the main 
winners in the newly deregulated telecommunications market. Word of these 
successes spread, and the developing mythology of the “new economy” attracted 
many first-time investors to the stock market. In 1998, despite the serious (but 
temporary) stock market decline caused by the Asian crisis, the number of IPOs 
climbed to 41. During the peak of the bubble in 1999 and 2000 there were more 
than 130 IPOs annually. At the same time, the number of IPOs on the main 
market increased only slightly.   
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Chart 1: IPOs in Germany: Neuer Markt and Main Markets (1986-2004) 
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The success of the Neuer Markt was based in part on widespread media 
coverage, which reached people previously not invested in the stock market. For 
example, the business television station "ntv" reported every half hour from the 
floor of the Frankfurt stock exchange. Popular publications including not only 
staid weeklies such as Spiegel but also television guides and fashion magazines 
expanded their coverage to include recommendations for purchasing stocks from 
the Neuer Markt.   
 
By 2000 the Neuer Markt had become by far the most significant growth stock 
market in Europe, accounting for over 50% of market capitalization, and 
overtaking markets in countries with more developed equity markets, such as the 
UK’s AIM and France’s Nouveau Marché (WestLB/Panmure Research 2000). 
Significantly, the Neuer Markt also had become a platform for IPOs for 
companies from other countries, including the US. The composition of the Neuer 
Markt appeared to be solidly high-tech, with 22 percent of the listed companies 
classified as Internet companies, 19 percent as technology companies, and 17 
percent as software companies. As time went on, an increasing proportion of 
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these companies were venture-capital backed, as a parallel rapid expansion was 
also taking place in the venture capital industry in Germany. In 2000, the German 
Venture Capital Association reported that half of all Neuer Markt IPOs had some 
form of venture capital participation. In a relatively short period of time, it 
therefore appeared as if Germany had successfully reformed its financial system 
so it was capable of supporting both “old” and “new” economy companies. 
However, this hubris rapidly turned out to be short lived.  
 
At the end of March 2000, after reaching an all-time high of over 9000, the 
Nemax all-shares index (composite index for companies on the the Neuer Markt) 
began a rapid descent that would bring it down to 300 by 2002. Perhaps even 
more devastating for the reputation of the Neuer Markt than this decline of over 
96% in stock market value, however, was the growing number of scandals that 
were emerging. Most of these involved managerial misrepresentation of the 
financial situation of the company. The most audacious of these was at 
Comroad, an internet company, where an investigative journalist found that 98 % 
of the sales for the first half of 1999 were accounted for by one contract with a 
nonexistent Hong Kong firm.  
 
However, the scandals uncovered spread beyond company managers, including 
price manipulation by the investment manager of one of the major funds 
specializing in small firm investment (Kurt Ochner, known at the time as “Mr. 
Neuer Markt”). Conflicts of interest were also uncovered for stock analysts and 
for the issuing departments of investment banks.  
 
This tarnished reputation, as much as the loss in share prices, led the Deutsche 
Börse in late 2002 to announce that it would be closing down the Neuer Markt by 
the end of 2003. As an alternative, it would restructure the stock indexes on the 
main market in order to try to accomodate the needs of high tech companies and 
their investors. Neuer Markt survivors meeting minimum standards for 
transparency and corporate governance would be pooled together with old 
economy companies in the new Prime Standard segment. The largest surviving 
technology companies would be included in the new technology index (TecDax 
50); Neuer Markt companies not meeting the minimum standards would be 
relegated to the segment named the General Standard. In all, the Neuer Markt 
experiment lasted six years.  
 
 
4. The Failure of the Neuer Markt: A Varieties of Capitalism Approach 
 
The conventional wisdom for the failure of the Neuer Markt in Germany focuses 
on the inability of regulators to adequately control “moral hazard” on the part of 
company managers and finance professionals vis-a-vis the investing public. In 
part influenced by this view, the government has responded by trying to tighten 
up company and securities law and by beefing up the enforcement capacities of 
the financial services regulator, BaFin (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungs-
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aufsicht). In March 2003 the federal finance ministry announced a 10 Point Plan 
defining a roadmap for passing legislation designed to improve transparency, to 
create new mechanisms for minority shareholder complaints, and to increase 
penalties for violators of securities law.    
 
Although the agency approach offers a simple, attractive explanation for the 
failure of the Neuer Markt which appears to have been accepted by policy-
makers, a number of facts cast doubt on the plausibility of this approach. One 
concern is that IPO activity stopped not only on the Neuer Markt, but also on the 
main Frankfurt market. Despite the increase in the level of the regulation overall, 
there were no IPOs on the main market at all in 2003, and only five in 2004. In 
other words, the decrease in activity below levels typical of the early 1990s would 
seem to indicate some type of shock to the investment community and financial 
system that spread beyond the Neuer Markt, i.e. of deeper problems within 
Germany.2
 
A second, related concern is that IPO activity since the bursting of the bubble has 
recovered significantly in many other countries. In the US, there were 85 IPOs 
with a value of $15.8 billion in 2003 and 219 IPOs worth $42.3 billion in 2004 (as 
of early December). Even more interesting is the contrast with the UK. In this 
country there were 94 IPOs in 2003 and 305 in 2004. It is particularly significant 
that the bulk of these (84% in 2003 and 86% in 2004) occurred on AIM 
(Alternative Investment Market) rather than the London Stock Exchange's main 
market. AIM is in fact much less regulated than either the main market or the 
German stock exchanges (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2002). This would indicate 
that investors are less concerned with the level of regulation than suggested by 
the principle-agent approach, and that something else is driving cross-national 
differences. 
 
A third concern is that, although scandals admittedly occurred on the Neuer 
Markt, in fact the extent of "moral hazard" activity arguably was much less in 
Germany than in the US, the "model" for tight securities regulation. For example, 
the percentage of IPOs accounted for by loss-making companies during the peak 
of the bubble was much lower in Germany than in the US. Furthermore, the 
finance scandals in Germany clearly paled in significance in comparison with the 
Enron scandal in the US. These facts cast doubt on the efficacy of the principal-
agent approach in explaining the failure of the Neuer Markt.  
 
An alternative explanation is provided by the varieties of capitalism (VOC) 
approach (Hall and Soskice 2001). In a nutshell, this approach makes a number 
of strong claims about the way advanced industrial economies function. The first 
claim is that the national institutional framework is a key determinant of how firms 
                                                 
2 Although there also appears to be some cyclical variation in IPO activity related to the business 
cycle, low economic growth since 2000 in Germany would not appear to explain all of the 
slowdown in IPO activity. During the 1992/93 post-unification economic crisis, which was 
arguably more severe than the 2000/01 recession, there were at least ten IPOs per year.   
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operating within this framework are organized and behave. The second claim is 
that economies can be analytically broken down into a number of discrete 
subsystems, such as financial systems, training and education systems, 
industrial relations systems, and R&D/technology transfer systems. The third 
claim is that there are strong complementarities between these subsystems. 
Economies with well-matched institutional subsystems will enjoy comparative 
advantages, whereas an institutional mismatch can adversely affect the 
operation of the economy. Finally, from a VOC perspective, advanced capitalist 
economies fall into two broad groups: liberal market economies (LMEs), such as 
the U.S.A. and the U.K., in which markets play a dominant role in economic 
governance; and coordinated market economies (CMEs), such as Germany, 
Japan, and Austria, in which non-market mechanisms play a particularly strong 
role in economic governance. LMEs are considered to offer a particularly 
supportive institutional environment for radical product and process innovation, 
e.g. in the high-tech industry, whereas CMEs are better at incremental innovation 
in medium-tech industries such as automobiles or machine building.  
 
 
TABLE 2: STYLIZED CHARACTERISTICS OF ENTREPRENEURIAL  
AND CONVENTIONAL FIRMS 
 
 
 
 
Characteristic 
 
 
Entrepreneurial   
 
 
Conventional 
 
Innovation Pattern Radical innovation Incremental innovation 
 
Standardization High. Operations and production 
are easy to scale. 
 
Low. A high proportion of costs are 
variable (labor, etc.). 
 
Profitability Loss making in the R&D stage. 
Highly profitable once 
consolidated. 
 
Moderate profitability throughout the 
entire business history. 
 
Growth Offensive growth orientation. 
 
Defensive growth orientation. 
 
Finance Risk-tolerant equity (venture 
capital, IPO)  
 
Risk-averse debt. 
 
     Source: Own compilation. 
 
 
Of particular interest for a VOC approach to high tech IPOs are the 
complementarities between financial systems and labor markets and the 
resulting implications for stock markets. A key distinction to be made here is 
between entrepreneurial and conventional firms (Engelhardt 2004; Engelhardt 
2005) (see Table 2):  
 
• Entrepreneurial firms attempt to develop radically new, standardized 
products, the production of which can be multiplied at decreasing costs 
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(economies of scale). Companies attempt to rapidly achieve a dominant 
position in the new market. Potential rewards are very high, particularly if a 
mass market develops for the product ("blockbuster"); economies of scale 
mean that profits increase more rapidly than the increase in production. 
Investors may therefore reap very high rewards as the value of the firm 
grows, and employees may also benefit financially, particularly if they are 
granted stock options in the company. However, the entrepreneurial 
company also involves high risks for both investors and employees. 
Companies developing radically new products have a high risk of failure, 
thus employees may loose their jobs and investors may loose the initial 
capital they invested in the company.   
 
• Conventional firms in contrast concentrate on competing in established 
markets through offering products with incremental improvements. The 
potential growth rate in sales and products is thus limited. The risks of job 
loss and capital loss are lower for employees and investors, but potential 
rewards are also lower.   
 
 
The successful high tech firms listed on US Nasdaq correspond to the 
entrepreneurial type of firm. Firms such as Microsoft (operating systems 
software), Intel (microchips), and Cisco Systems (network hardware) all started 
out by offering a standardized, but radically new type of product that enjoyed 
economies of scale and created a new market. Although conventional high-tech 
firms do exist, they tend to focus on providing customized software for one or a 
limited number of customers, or IT services. 
 
An important empirical regularity in financial economics is the positive 
relationship between the return and risk of different asset classes (Bernstein 
2001; Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton 2002). Return is the increase in the value of 
the initial investment in the asset. Risk is the variance in the returns of an asset 
class. Concretely, although expected returns may be positive, the investor faces 
the risk that annual returns for a number of years after the investment is made 
may be negative. The intuition behind this relationship is that investors will 
demand a risk premium (i.e. higher expected returns) for riskier assets (i.e. those 
with more volatile returns). This general relationship is summarized in Figure 1, 
which shows the positive relationship between return and risk (defined as the 
variance of returns).   
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FIGURE 1: RISK-RETURN RELATIONSHIP IN INVESTMENTS 
 
 
High 
 
 
        
 
The concept of investors with different preferences for reward and risk is well 
known from financial economics (see section 4.1 below), but can also be applied 
to human capital. Due to the greater probability of bankruptcy, entrepreneurial 
firms involve higher risks for employees than conventional firms. Employees will 
thus demand strong financial incentives from the company in the form of stock 
options or incentive pay, so that they will enjoy high financial rewards in case the 
company is successful. Risk-averse managers, however, will be reluctant to work 
for a startup company, even if the expected returns may be high.  
 
The primary thesis presented here is that successful entrepreneurial firms require 
an adequate supply of both risk-tolerant capital and experienced, risk-tolerant 
entrepreneurial managers and scientists. This situation can be displayed 
graphically (see Figure 2). The vertical dimension represents the risk-reward 
profile of investors; investors at the bottom will be willing to invest in low risk, low 
reward products, whereas investors at the top will be willing to incur higher risks 
in the expectation of higher rewards. A parallel can be made for labor markets, 
displayed on the horizontal axis. Risk-averse managers and scientists will be 
willing to take jobs in which the potential financial rewards may not be large, but 
the risk of job loss is low (left side of Figure 2). Conversely, risk-loving managers 
Low                                                                              High 
RETURN 
Low  
RISK (Variance of Returns) 
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and scientists will be willing to accept a high risk of job loss if potential rewards 
are quite high (right side of Figure 2). 
 
The lower left hand quadrant of Figure 2 can thus be understood as an 
equilibrium for conventional firms, in which both the financing and labor available 
seek low risk, low reward possibilities. The upper right quadrant, in contrast, 
represents an equilibrium for entrepreneurial firms, in which both investors, 
managers and scientists are willing to incur higher risks in search of higher 
rewards. The upper left hand and lower right hand quadrants, on the other hand, 
represent disequilibria, in which the risk profiles of investors and employees do 
not match.  
 
 
 
FIGURE 2: RISK-RETURN EXPECTATIONS AND EQUILLIBRIA FOR  
ENTREPRENURIAL AND CONVENTIONAL COMPANIES 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
The following sections detail shifts in the financial market and labor market 
position of Germany within the context of a discussion of the Varieties of 
Capitalism approach. It will be argued that Germany experienced a temporary 
shift from the low to high financial market risk-return expectations in the late 
Low                                                                              High 
Financial Investor 
Risk-Return 
Expectations 
High 
Entrepreneurial 
Company 
Equillibrium 
Conventional 
Company 
Equillibrium 
Low  
Employee Risk- 
Return Expectations 
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1990s, but that labor market expectations did not fundamentally change. 
Graphically, Germany shifted from the lower left hand quadrant (conventio
company equilibrium) to the upper left hand equilibrium (position of 
disequilibrium) in the late 1990s, but reverted to the lower left hand q
2000/2001.  
 
nal 
uadrant in 
.1 Supply of Risk Capital 
n important general finding in financial economics is that there is a positive 
hip 
and 
TABLE 3: RISK-RETURN CHARACTERISTICS OF 
 
 
4
 
A
relationship between the return and risk of different asset classes (Bernstein 
2001; Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton 2002). The intuition behind this relations
is that investors will demand a risk premium (i.e. higher expected returns) for 
riskier assets (i.e. those with more volatile returns). Table 3 displays the risks 
rewards typically associated with three different types of financial assets: bank 
loans/bonds, stock in large, established ("blue chip") companies, and stock in 
young companies.    
 
 
 
DIFFERENT ASSET CLASSES 
  
Type of Investment 
 
Risk 
 
Reward 
Bank Loan or Bond Low Low 
 
Stock in Established Medium Medium 
Company  
 
Venture Capital or Stock in High Potentially High 
Growing High Tech 
Company 
 
Source: Own compilation. 
able 4 provides an empirical illustration of this relationship based on historical 
 
 
T
data for different US asset types:  
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TABLE 4: Return and Risk on Different US Asset Classes, 1926-98 
 
 
Asset Class 
   
Annualized Return 
1926-98 (%) 
 
Standard 
Deviation 1926-98 
(%) 
 
Worst single 
year return 
1926-98 (%) 
1 Month US  3.77 3.22 0 
Treasury bill 
 
5 Year US 
te 
 5.31 5.71 -2.65 
Treasury no
 
Large 
ny 
11.22 20.26 -43.3 
compa
stocks 
 
Small 
ny 
12.18 38.09 -58.0 
compa
stocks 
 
     S urce: (Bernstein 2001: 10).  
• Short-term debt issued by the US government (1 month US treasury bills) 
 
 
 
 
• Medium-term US government debt is also considered quite safe in terms 
s 
onth 
 
                                                
o
 
 
is considered the safest investment by financial investors. The risk that the
US government will default on its debt is seen to be virtually zero. In no 
single year in the period 1926-98 did investors in this asset experience a
loss.3 However, this asset class also had the lowest returns (3.77 % on an
annualized basis); 
of default risk. However, the value of this debt fluctuates with medium-run 
inflation expectations. A purchaser of a 5 year Treasury note, for example, 
is exposed to the risk that expectations of inflation may increase after the 
purchase, leading to a decrease in medium-term interest rates and thus a 
decrease in the nominal value of the securities. The volatility of returns 
between 1926-98 has thus been about 75 percent higher for 5 year note
than for 1 month bills, with the worst annual return amounting to 2.65 
percent. Investors have thus demanded a risk premium relative to 1 m
bills of about 2.5 percentage points (5.31 percent versus 3.77 percent) on 
an annualized basis;   
 
3 The volatility in returns arises from the fact that short-term interest rates fluctuate with monetary 
policy and inflation expectations. Reinvesting the capital on a monthly basis thus has some 
variation in returns due to these shifting interest rates. 
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• The return on the stocks of large companies is substantially higher than 
). 
r 
 
• Small company stock offers the highest return of all asset classes shown 
   
 practice most investors are not be prepared to invest in all types of assets. 
 
rn.   
ince different types of assets have varying risk-reward profiles, heterogeneity in 
s, such as 
r 
 
ns 
MEs and CMEs differ substantially in their ability to provide risk capital to stock 
s 
the return on US government debt (11.22 percent on an annualized basis
However, the volatility of returns is almost four times higher than that for 5 
year notes and more than six times higher than that for 1 month bills 
(standard deviation of about 20 %). The maximum loss in a single yea
came to 43 percent during 1926-98; and 
(12.18 percent annualized return), but also involve by far the highest risk, 
with almost twice the volatility of large company stocks and a maximum 
annual loss of 58 percent.   
 
In
Instead, investors are distinguished by different risk-reward preferences. Risk-
averse investors will prefer assets with a low expected return and low variability
of returns ("low risk"). Risk-loving investors, on the other hand, are willing to 
accept a higher level of risk in order to achieve a higher expected level of retu
 
S
risk preferences among investors lead to different levels of demand for different 
kinds of financial assets. Risk-averse investors will find loans or company bonds 
most attractive, since these assets offer a low return (generally a fixed interest 
rate) but also lower risk. In the event of company bankruptcy, loan or 
bondholders are repaid before holders of other types of financial claim
shareholders. Investors with moderate levels of risk aversion, on the other hand, 
will be attracted to stocks in established companies; historically, stocks have 
offered a significantly higher return than bonds, but also carry somewhat highe
risk, since shareholders are the last claimants in case of company bankruptcy 
(Siegel 1994). Finally, risk-loving investors will be attracted to investments in 
venture capital or in the stock of growing high-tech companies, since they are
willing to accept a high risk of non-repayment in return for the exceptional retur
that may be realized from investments in rapidly-growing companies. 
 
L
markets. Table 5 details the rate of IPO activity in different countries. LMEs have 
a significantly higher rate of IPOs over the past decade and a half, at between 
roughly 40 to 60 IPOs per million residents. The most important CMEs, Japan 
and Germany, have a fraction of the IPO activity experienced by LMEs over thi
period.    
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TABLE 5: Rate of IPOs in Different Countries, 1986-2002 
 
  
Type of 
Country 
Country 
 
IPO Rate per 
million 
residents 
 
LMEs: Canada 1 6
 UK 55 
 Australia 51 
 US 45 
   
CMEs: apan 2 J 1
 Germany   7 
Sources: Own calculati utsches eninstitut 2003; 
 
 
ne factor affecting the potential amount of risk capital supplied to stock markets 
 
k 
TABLE 6: Percentage of Retirement Income Provided by  
 
ons from (De  Akti
How and Yeo 2002; PriceWaterhouseCoopers 1998; PWC 2000;
PWC 2004).  
O
is the distribution of retirement income provision between the "three pillars" of      
household savings at pension funds, i.e. state pensions, occupational/company 
pensions and private retirement savings. Pension funds have become the most 
important investor in the stock market in countries like the US and UK. Countries
in which the large bulk of retirement savings are provided by state "pay as you 
go" pension systems by definition will have less capacity to provide a pool of ris
capital coming from pension funds or private pension savings.  
 
 
State Pensions, late 1990s 
  
Country 
 
% of Retirement Income from  
State Pensions 
 
LMEs:  
     UK 61 
     US 46 
  
CMEs:  
     Spain 92 
     Austria 92 
     Germany 82 
     Italy 74 
     France 51 
     Netherlands 49 
S nk Research, Deutsches Institut für Altersvorsorge  ource: Deutsche Ba
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Retired e on state 
 
ut of 
 second factor influencing the supply of risk capital to the stock market is the 
with direct 
TABLE 7: Percentage of Households with Share  
         
 persons in Germany have one of the highest levels of relianc
pensions in the OECD (see Table 6). In the late 1990s, an estimated 82 percent
of total income of retirees was accounted for by the state pension system. 
Furthermore, company pensions in Germany are for the most part funded o
book reserves set aside within the company's balance sheet, rather than out of 
capitalized pension funds (Jackson and Vitols 2001).      
 
A
financial risk preferences of the household sector. German households have a 
particularly high aversion to risk in financial investment in comparative 
perspective. One indicator for this is the low percentage of households 
or indirect (i.e. through equity mutual fund) share ownership (see Table 7).4  
 
 
Ownership, by Country (ca. 2000) 
 
ype of Country 
 
T Country 
  
Direct 
Ownership
   
Direct and 
Indirect 
Ownership 
 
LMEs:  Australia 39 51 
 US  51 
 Canada  48 
 New Zealand 30 44 
 UK 27 34 
    
CMEs: witzerland 28 30 S
 Sweden 22  
 France 15 23 
 Netherlands 14 24 
 Hong Kong  20 
 Germany 9 19 
 Italy 7 15 
 Korea  8 
         Sources: (Australian Sto nge 2004; Deutsches Aktieninstitut 200 uiso, 
 
                                                
ck Excha 3; G
Haliassos, and Jappelli 2003: Table 4). 
 
 
4 The reasons for these cross-national differences are not well understood. Financial wealth and 
income are generally positively correlated with the proportion of household assets invested in 
risky assets such as stocks. However, coefficients on country dummies in regressions on 
individual level data pooled together from different countries are generally large and significant 
(Guiso et al. 2003). Historically, government policies towards mass share ownership have varied 
widely. For much of the twentieth century, German governments have taken a critical view toward 
mass participation in the stock market.    
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There was no significant change in retirement policy in Germany in the second 
 
 the 
t 
in 
 
 
TABLE 8: Annual Average Investment per Capita in Equity Funds,  
 
half of the 1990s which would have yielded a significant growth in pension funds
investing in the stock market. However, there was a major increase in the 
amount of funds the household sector invested in the stock market through
vehicle of equity funds. Detailed figures available for US and Germany show tha
the rate of investment in equity funds in Germany in the first half of the 1990s 
was about one tenth the level in the US (Table 8). The rate of investment 
increased in both countries in the late 1990s, but much more dramatically 
percentage terms in Germany than in the US (ca. 1000 percent versus ca. 50
percent). In the period 2001-2003 household investment in equity funds in both
countries has returned to historical norms. 
 
 
 
in US Dollars, 1991-2003 
  
Country 
 
1991-96 
 
1997-2000 
 
2001-03 
US 420 662 385 
Germany 37 417 66 
    Sou nds data, BVI Jahrbuch.   
 Parity (PPP)  
 
.2 Labor Markets for Scientists and Managers 
s noted above, a key part of the argument is that the success of entrepreneurial 
-
ing 
r 
he importance of mid-career labor markets can be seen when examining the 
s of at 
rces: US Flow of Fu
  Note: German data adjusted for Purchasing Power
 
 
 
4
 
A
startups is influenced by the characteristics of both labor markets and financial 
markets. In particular, CMEs have considerably less open labor markets for mid
career scientists, engineers and managers. In systems where employees are 
oriented towards long-term careers with the same company, and in which train
and socialization takes place after entry into this company, it is difficult to get a 
job at another company in mid-career. This therefore creates a "vicious circle" 
situation, where it is not easy to recruit experienced engineers and managers fo
risky start-ups, since many are not willing to take the risk of not being able to 
reenter the labor market at an established firm after the failure of a startup.  
 
T
career histories of founders of successful US entrepreneurial software 
companies (see Table 9). These companies have achieved annual sale
least $ 200 million in 2003 and fulfill the definition of "entrepreneurial" outlined 
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above. It is striking that, although the mythology of the "whiz kid" entrepreneur i
widely accepted, only Bill Gates fits the profile of a very young person with no 
extensive work experience.  In fact the typical entrepreneur is in his mid-30s to
mid-40s and has significant experience with a high technology company. 
 
s 
 
TABLE 9: Characteristics of Founders of Successful US 
 
 
Entrepreneurial Software Companies 
      
Company 
 
 
Software Sector 
 
 
Founding 
Year 
 
Founder  
Name 
 
Age at 
Founding 
 
Work Experience Prior to 
Foundation 
 
Microsoft perating 5 Bill O
Systems 
 
197 Gates 20 Minimal 
Oracle Datab 1977 Larry Ellison 33 Ampex Corp., CIA ase 
 
BEA 
Systems 
re/ 
 III 
Infrastructu
Network 
ent Managem
1995 William 
Coleman
47 Sun Microsystems (10 
years)  
   56 echnology (7 
s 
Ed Scott Pyramid T
years), Sun Microsystem
(3 years) 
   Alfred Chuang 33 
 
Sun Microsystems (9 years) 
Adobe Graphical 1982 Charl
 Software 
es 
Geschke
43 Xerox (ca. 10 years) 
  
 
 John Warnock 42 Xerox (4 years) 
VeriSign E-commerce 
 
1995 James Bidzos 40 RSA (9 years) 
Citrix 
Systems i 
Enterprise 
Network 
 
1989 Edward 
Iacobucc
35 IBM (11 years) 
Documentum Document 
Management 
1990 o 35 Ingres (database software) Howard Sha
(6 years), TTI/Citicorp (3 
years), Transtech (startup) 
Hyperion 1991 James Dorrian 38 
Solutions 
Management 
information 
Solutions Technology, 
Thorn EMI Computer 
Software 
i2 Resource 
Planning 
1988 Sanjiv Sidhu 31 Texas Instruments 
Sources: SEC ompany Websites 
here is substantial evidence, however, that the mobility of founders and 
unity 
lated 
that 
 Filings, C
 
 
 
T
personnel involved in R&D is quite low and mid-career labor markets are 
underdeveloped in Germany. One source of evidence is European Comm
Labour Force Survey data on the mobility of HRST (Human Resources in 
Science and Technology). HRST include scientists, engineers, and R&D-re
managers. This survey confirms the picture of broad differences between LMEs 
and CMEs and of particularly low mobility in Germany (Stimpson 2000). The 
mobility statistic reported in Table 10 represents the percentage of personnel 
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have started a new job in the past year. The two LMEs in the study (Ireland and 
the UK) are among the top three countries in terms of the mobility of HRST 
personnel in high tech industry. The only exception to the rank ordering is Sp
(a CME), which has the highest rate of mobility in high tech industry.
ain 
ermany, on the other hand, is second to last in mobility in high tech among the 
 
TABLE 10: MOBILITY RATES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
 
5  
 
G
countries under study. The mobility rate in the UK is almost twice as high as the 
rate in Germany (18.3 percent versus 10.1 percent). This figure likely understates
the differences in the degree of mobility for mid-career personnel. The figure is 
skewed by very high mobility rates (ca. 50 percent) for persons aged 20 to 30 
who are starting their first job. A rate calculated for persons aged 35-55 would 
most likely reveal much stronger differences between countries in mobility.    
 
 
(HRST) PERSONNEL, 1997 
Country             HRST Mobility Rates 
 
High        Information and       Whole 
Tech        Communication     Economy 
                 Technology 
  
Spain 23.8 22.9 24.0
Ireland 22.6 27.2 16.4 
UK 18.3 24.5 16.9 
Netherlands 13.7 18.8 8.8 
Finland 13.5 21.4 16.9 
Sweden 13.4 17.7 10.3 
Belgium 12.9 15.6 10.0 
Denmark 12.3 15.5 14.6 
France 10.9 12.1 13.2 
Norway 10.7 18.7 16.9 
Germany 10.1 13.1 10.9 
Italy 6.9 6.6 6.1 
                    S : (Stimpson 2000: 1
 general economic growth rates have been higher in LMEs than in CMEs in the 
te 
 
                                                
ource 1) 
 
 
In
past decade. Economic growth would help explain part of the differences in 
mobility, since countries with a higher growth rate would be expected to crea
more new jobs. Nevertheless, important structural features of labor markets in 
different countries appear to be quite different. One important study (Mason and
Wagner 1999), for example, showed that recruitment practices for HRST 
 
5 We do not have a full explanation of why Spain has the highest level of HRST mobility. Partial 
factors may include the rapid growth of high tech industry in Spain as well as the flexibility that the 
extensive use of temporary contracts in that country creates.  
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personnel in the UK and Germany were quite different, with mid-career lab
markets being much more open in the UK:  
 
or 
"The differences in the mix of new and experienced graduate recruits 
 
ourses 
f 
 
"At the same time, however, British managers also stressed the 
ernal 
ure, 
le, 
e (Mason 
 
ongitudinal data calculated over the late 1990s indicates a general trend 
anges 
 
.3 Summing Up  
he shifting position of Germany can be displayed on Figure 3 as follows. Prior to 
f 
observed in the British and German electronics samples are 
therefore closely linked to inter-country differences in higher 
education structures and industry linkages. New First degree
graduates in Britain have typically followed shorter, narrower c
of study than their German counterparts and are also less likely to 
have had any serious exposure to industrial workplaces. Hence, a 
key reason for British sample employers recruiting only 30% o
new graduate recruits directly from university is simply that 
such new, young graduates are unlikely to be ‘effective from 
Day One’ and will indeed require considerable training when they 
first start." 
advantages of bringing in new scientists and engineers with 
experience of RD&D in other organisations and contexts. Ext
recruitment of this kind was seen as a powerful way of gaining 
access to knowledge and ideas which were not available in 
written form. This process would often be incremental in nat
with new team members regularly drawing on their experience 
elsewhere to suggest ‘new ways of looking at things’, for examp
different ways of tackling problems or applying knowledge already 
existing within each firm. Without such inter-firm mobility, British 
managers argued, their RD&D activity was likely to become 
‘incestuous’ and fall victim to the ‘not invented here’ syndrom
and Wagner 1999: 20)." 
 
L
towards somewhat higher mobility rates across countries, but no radical ch
in the degree of mobility or in the rank ordering of countries (Stimpson 2000). 
The German labor market for mid-career managers and scientists does not 
appear to have become significantly more open over the past half a decade.
 
 
 
4
 
T
1997, Germany was located in a conventional company equilibrium in which both 
investors and employees had a low risk-reward profile. In the late 1990s there 
was a significant increase in the amount of risk capital. The surge in high tech 
IPOs on the Neuer Markt was attributable to this brief surge in the availability o
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risk capital. Since 2001, however, the supply of risk capital has reverted to levels
corresponding more to the norms of the 1980s and first part of the 1990s.  
 
 
erman labor markets, however, never fundamentally changed, and a large 
 
 
FIGURE 3: RISK-RETURN EXPECTATIONS IN GERMAN LABOR  
 
      
 
G
supply of experienced managers and scientists willing to join startup companies 
never developed. Although startup companies on the entrepreneurial model were
able to attract risk capital, they never had enough experienced managers and 
scientists needed to succeed. Thus in the late 1990s Germany briefly shifted up
to the upper left hand quadrant (a situation of disequilibrium). Since then it has 
shifted back to the conventional company equilibrium in the lower left hand 
quadrant.   
 
 
 
AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 
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4.4 Evidence from the Software Industry 
ed from an examination of IPOs in 
e software and IT services industries in Germany and the UK. Software is 
 
are 
 
 
CHART 2: Number of IPOs in the German and UK Software and 
IT Services Industry, 1990-2002 
 
 
Evidence supporting this view can be gather
th
arguably the premiere industry for entrepreneurial companies, since the costs of
increasing production are negligible (i.e. the cost of a CD for duplicating softw
code) (Engelhardt 2004). A successful standardized product can sell millions of 
copies, reaping millions or even billions of dollars in profits. The most prominent 
example of an entrepreneurial company in software is Microsoft, which has long 
been the largest company in the US in terms of stock market capitalization (i.e. 
the financial value of the shares of a company). However, the costs of developing
a new software application can be quite high, and startup companies can spend
millions of dollars without a guarantee of ever making a cent in sales. Software 
startup companies are therefore seen as a risky, but potentially quite rewarding 
investment. 
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Source: Own calculations from Deutsche Börse and London Stock Exchange data 
 
he software industry is one of the areas of high tech where Germany is seen as 
articularly weak (Lehrer 2000). Only one of the top 20 world software 
nce in 
e 
 
T
p
companies (by sales) is a German company, SAP. Software companies are one 
example of the type of high risk companies that find it difficult to find fina
Germany. Between 1990 and 1996 there was only one software IPO in Germany 
(see Chart 2). Although the number of software IPOs in Germany exploded in th
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latter part of the 1990s, reaching a high of 50 in 2000, there were only three IPOs 
in this industry in 2001, and no software IPOs since then. The UK also 
experienced a substantial increase in software IPO activity in the late 1990s. 
However, the increase was less dramatic since there was a higher histo
of activity. Between 1990 and 1996 there were 60 software IPOs in the UK. 
Although activity dropped strongly after 2000, there still were 15 software IPOs in 
2001 and seven in 2002 (compared with the complete drop off in activity in 
Germany). 
 
In practice it
rical base 
 appears that two kinds of software and IT services companies 
ctually came to the market in Germany in the 1997-2001 period. On the one 
 
ntrepreneurial (mainly companies trying to develop standardized software in 
al, 
e 
are) fit 
ience at 
 at 
pport of the Varieties of 
apitalism-based "temporary disequilibrium" argument. One is that the proportion 
as 
t 
e 
a
hand, companies that can be classified as "conventional" (mainly IT services
companies as well as software companies in mature sectors) arguably did not 
need risk capital for their moderate growth strategies. These companies took 
advantage of the financial euphoria and raised capital on the Neuer Markt.  
 
On the other hand, a number of companies that could be classified as 
e
newer areas such as internet and security applications) also had IPOs 
(Engelhardt 2004). Although these entrepreneurial companies raised risk capit
the characteristics of their founders were quite different than those of th
founders of successful entrepreneurial software companies in the US displayed 
in Table 9 above. The founders of only one of the companies (IXOS Softw
the profile of the successful entrepreneurial US software company of mid-career 
employees with substantial experience with at least one other high tech 
company. Most founders in Germany were in their 20s or early 30s, and their 
work experience was typically independent consulting experience, exper
a traditional company (machine building or financial services), or research jobs
a university or research institute (see Table 11). 
 
Two further pieces of evidence can be taken in su
C
of companies that could be classified as "entrepreneurial" as opposed to 
"conventional" was rather low in Germany in comparison with the UK. Only 27 
percent of the German software companies were clearly entrepreneurial, 
opposed to 44 percent in the UK. Secondly, German entrepreneurial software 
companies failed to achieve major market share in new industries. The larges
software company in terms of sales in Table 11 above was about € 100 million in 
2002 (Engelhardt 2005). The sales of leading internet software companies in th
US, in contrast, reached $ 1 billion or even more in 2002, such as Verisign ($ 1.2 
billion) and BEA Systems ($ 1 billion). 
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TABLE 11: Characteristics of Founders of German Entrepreneurial 
Software Companies on the Neuer Markt 
 
  
Founding Company 
 
 
Year 
 
 
IPO 
Year 
 
 
Founder Name 
 
 
 
Age at 
 
Work Experience Prior to Firm 
Founding 
 
Foundation 
 
Intraware 1994 2000 Lars Bornemann 26 Apprenticeship as Betriebswirt 
   Joachim Weber chhochschule Fulda 25 Lecturer at Fa
LS telcom 1992 2000 Manfred Lebherz 28 Doctoral studies at U. Karlsruhe 
   Georg Schöne 32 Doctoral studies at U. Karlsruhe, 
Dose Maschinenbau (3 yrs) 
b.i.s. börsen-
formations-
, 
in
systeme 
1990 1999 Eberhard Mayer 33 Programmer at FAG Kugelfischer
Berliner Bank 
CYCOS 1984 2000 Klaus Pfleiderer 28 Electrical Engineer Studies at RWT
Aachen 
H 
IBS 1982 2000 Klaus-Jürgen 
Schröder 
32 Researcher at RWTH Aachen 
PIRONET 199 lding 5 2000 Mehrdad 
Piroozram 
23 Apprenticeship with Kaufhof Ho
Wapme 
Systems 
1996 2000 André Borutta 29 Apprenticeship with Mercedes-Benz, 
Economics Studies at 
Fachhochschule Düsseldorf 
    Wilhelm Kapell 31 Apprenticeship with Dresdner Bank, 
Economics Studies at 
Fachhochschule Düsseldorf 
EASY 
Software 
1990 1999  Markus Hanisch 27 Sales Departments of Mannesmann 
and Philips 
   Dirk Vollmering 46 IBM (System Consulting, 4 years), 
rhv Softwaretechnik 
MIS  1988 1999 Peter Raue 31 Independent Consultant 
   Jiri Vodicka 28 Consultant Experience (2 years) 
Nemetschek or, 1980 1999 Georg 
Nemetschek 
45 Civil Engineering Profess
Consulting  
IXOS 1988 1998 Eberhard Fäber 45 CEO of PCS Computersysteme 
GmbH (18 yrs) 
   Hans Strack-
Zimmermann 
45 Siemens, Public Research Institutes 
mb Software 1975 1998 ch Bernhard Murs 27 Studies in Civil Engineering 
CAA 1990 2000 r Gabriele Mülle 30 IT consultant 
   titute Hans-Peter 
Schmidt 
31 Researcher at Fraunhofer Ins
BROKAT 
Infosystems 
1994 1998 Stefan Röver 29 Software consultant 
   yrs) Boris Anderer 36 McKinsey consultant (5 
   
 
Achim 
Schlumpberger
29 IT consultant 
   Michael 
Schumacher 
33 IT consultant 
S
 
ource: Comp ny IPO Pr pectuses
 
a os  
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5. Conclusion: High-Tech Policy Alternatives for Germany 
riment was not 
rimarily the result of lax regulation, but rather a classic illustration of the 
k 
 
er 
e 
uer Markt raises the question of what types of policies for 
romoting the development of high tech industry are realistic in the German 
t 
r 
 high 
 the 
olicy measures to increase the 
upply of risk capital, but this time in conjunction with a radical deregulation of 
o the 
an 
th 
lowed 
 solution", named after the approach 
llowed by the Swedish telecommunications equipment company over the past 
n 
ing 
 
This paper has argued that the failure of the "Neuer Markt" expe
p
difficulties of transplanting individual institutions from LMEs into CMEs. In this 
case, an institution that works well in the US and UK, that is, a growth stoc
market with high reporting standards and minority shareholder protection, failed
to successfully promote high-tech IPOs in the long run in Germany.  The pap
has linked these shortages to the structure of the German labor and financial 
markets, in particular the low-risk orientation of both investors and experienced 
mid-career scientists and managers. The brief period of apparent success of th
Neuer Markt can be attributed to a short-lived increase in risk capital availability 
in the late 1990s.    
 
The failure of the Ne
p
context. The VOC analysis provided above suggests three alternatives. The firs
alternative is to stick to the status quo ("no new policies"). One justification fo
this would be the argument that Germany's comparative institutional advantage 
lies in medium-tech industry. Due to large expenditures on R&D by industries 
such as motor vehicles, chemicals and machine tools, German R&D investment 
is only slightly behind the US in terms of a percentage of GDP (2.5 percent 
versus 2.7 of GDP, respectively, in 2000 according to OECD statistics). As a 
result, Germany should concentrate on rapidly diffusing and effectively using
technology products (such as software and computer hardware) developed in
US rather than trying to replicate capacity. 
 
A second alternative would be to reinstate p
s
labor markets. This would represent an attempt to simultaneously shift 
Germany's position in both labor and financial markets from low to high risk-
reward expectations (i.e. from the "conventional company equilibrium" t
"entrepreneurial company equilibrium"). The expectation here would be that 
increase in the supply of risk capital would be more effective in conjunction wi
the opening of labor markets, including labor markets for managers and 
scientists. This solution, however, appears to be politically infeasible in the near 
future, as illustrated by the moderate approach to labor market reform fol
by the Hartz Commission (Vitols 2004).  
 
A third alternative might be the "Ericsson
fo
decade (Casper 2005; Casper and Whitley 2004). Despite the fact that Swede
is a CME in many respects similar to Germany (including in labor market wage 
coordination), Sweden has achieved greater success in promoting high tech 
startups than Germany. One reason is that Ericsson, one of the largest 
employers in Sweden, provides a reemployment guarantee to employees leav
 27
the company to work for a startup in the event of failure of the startup. T
is positive not only in the sense that it reduces individual risks for employees 
wishing to start a firm. It also helps break the vicious circle of low mobility by 
creating a pool of personnel moving back and forth between companies. This 
solution would require agreement by Germany's leading technology companie
such as Siemens and SAP, to jointly implement such a policy in order to help 
address the problem of a relatively closed labor market for scientists and 
managers. These startups could potentially be financed in part by the venture 
capital subsidiaries set up by these large companies (Corporate Venture C
 
his policy 
s, 
apital). 
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